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Introduction
Throughout history, humans have looked to nature as a source of new
medicine and tools. In modern times, that search has become a highly
profitable commercial enterprise.1 Biodiversity prospecting (bioprospecting)-the search for naturally occurring and commercially valuable genetic
and biochemical resources 2 -has led to many significant pharmaceutical
and industrial advancements, including the development of drugs to treat
cancer and HIV as well as the discovery of bioremediation tools to aid in oil
spill cleanups. 3 Though many bioprospecting missions focus on plants
and tropical rainforests, the marine environment and its unique inhabi4
tants represent a promising new area of research.
Scientists previously considered the deep seas to be azoic, or devoid of
living organisms; 5 however, research has revealed that the deep-sea ecosystem contains an extremely diverse array of organisms. 6 Despite the deep
sea's freezing temperatures, high water pressure, and low light levels, as
well as the high temperature and acidity levels associated with deep-sea
hydrothermal vents, many deep-sea organisms flourish in the extreme conditions of the seabed. 7 With recent developments in biotechnology, scientists have gained significant insight into how these organisms survive in
their extreme environments by isolating and studying the specific DNA
sequences responsible for these organisms' adaptations. 8 The pharmaceu1. See Richard J. McLaughlin, Foreign Access to Shared Marine Genetic Materials:
Management Optionsfor a Quasi-FugaciousResource, 34 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 297, 298
(2003) (noting that seven of the world's twenty-five top-selling drugs came from naturally occurring genetic resources, totaling $11.6 billion in sales).
2. See SALVATORE ARICO & CHARLOTTE SALPIN, UNITED
ADVANCED

STUDIES, BIOPROSPECTING

TIFIC, LEGAL AND POLICY ASPECTS 8

3. See, e.g.,

NATIONS

UNIV.-INST.

OF GENETIC RESOURCES IN THE DEEP SEABED: SCIEN-

(2005).

DAVID LEARY, UNITED NATIONS UNIV.-INST. ADVANCED STUDIES, BIOPROS-

PECTING IN THE ARCTIC 12-17 (2008) [hereinafter LEARY, UNU-IAS REPORT].

4. See, e.g.,

DAVID KENNETH LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GENETIC RESOURCES

OF THE DEEP SEA 13 (2007) [hereinafter LEARY, DEEP SEA]; Lyle Glowka, Bioprospecting,

Alien Invasive Species, and Hydrothermal Vents: Three Emerging Legal Issues in the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, 13 TUL. ENVTL. LJ. 329, 349-60 (2000).

5. See

WILLIAM J.

BROAD,

THE UNIVERSE BELOW: DISCOVERING THE SECRETS OF THE

(1997).
6. According to a recent estimate, deep-seas species represent as much as
78.5%-96% of global biodiversity. Id at 46.
7. See LEARY, UNU-IAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 9; LEARY, DEEP SEA, supra note 4, at
7-9. Hydrothermal vents are underwater hot springs associated with tectonically active
portions of the deep seabed whose fluid is a mixture of seawater, dissolved minerals and
chemicals such as hydrogen sulfide. Glowka, supra note 4, at 349 n.98 (citing ELLIOTT
DEEP SEA 45

A.

NORSE ET AL., GLOBAL MARINE BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: A STRATEGY FOR BUILDING CONSER-

11 (1993)); see also ARICO &
9-13.
8. See LEARY, UNU-IAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 12-17.
VATION INTO DECISION MAKING 6, 7,

SALPIN,

supra note 2, at
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tical industry is eager to utilize this emerging information in the search for
novel drugs, 9 while the textile, cosmetics, and other chemical manufacturing industries are hoping to incorporate the discoveries into their own
operations. 10

Bioprospecting for these marine genetic resources (MGRs) implicates
two major international legal disciplines. The first is environmental law
with a focus on the sustainable development and conservation of living
resources, as well as the environmental impact of bioprospecting research
missions."
This approach frames the issue as one of maintaining
biodiversity. 12 The second approach is property law, which deals with
both the right of access to the deep-sea organisms themselves and the right
to reap the benefits of the resulting genetic information. 13 Unlike the environmental approach, property law treats deep-sea organisms as genetic
resources and revolves around ownership issues. 14 This Note will examine
the latter category of ownership.
Access to and ownership of deep-sea MGRs are two emerging and
highly contentious issues, particularly with regard to Arctic and Antarctic
MGRs. 15 Although some MGR-rich areas are located within national jurisdictions and their respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), 16 the
majority of MGRs, including those in the polar regions, are located in
waters that are beyond all national jurisdictions. 1 7 Unfortunately, the
9. See ARICO & SALPIN, supra note 2, at 27.
10. See LEARY, UNU-IAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 12-17.
11. See, e.g., David J. Bederman & Soniya P. Keskar, Antarctic Environmental Liability: The Stockholm Annex and Beyond, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1383 (2005); George Frisvoid & Kelly Day-Rubenstein, Bioprospecting and Biodiversity Conservation: What
Happens When Discoveries Are Made?, 50 ARIz. L. REV. 545 (2008).
12. See ANTHONY J. STENSON & TIM S. GRAY, THE POLITICS OF GENETIC RESOURCE CONTROL 4 (1999); see, e.g., Anna Vinson, Note, Deep Sea Bottom Trawling and the Eastern
Tropical Pacific Seascape: A Test Case for Global Action, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 355,
356-59 (2006) (discussing environmental effects of deep-sea bottom trawling on maintaining biodiversity).
13. See, e.g., Kirsten E. Zewers, Bright Future for Marine Genetic Resources, Bleak
Futurefor Settlement of Ownership Rights: Reflections on the United Nations Law of the Sea
Consultative Process on Marine Genetic Resources, 5 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 151,
151-52 (2008) (proposing a property law solution that resolves access issues and provides benefits to countries involved in oceanographic excavation).
14. See STENSON & GRAY, supra note 12, at 4 (terming deep-sea organisms as "genetic
resources"); Zewers, supra note 13, at 151-52 (framing the property issue as one of
ownership).
15. See LEARY, UNU-IAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 7-8; David Leary, Bi-Polar Disorder?
Is Bioprospecting an Emerging Issue for the Arctic as Well as for Antarctica? 17 RECIEL 41,
45 (2008) [hereinafter Leary, Bi-Polar Disorder?];see also infra Part III for a discussion of
the current state of debates among UN member states on this issue.
16. See LEARY, UNU-IAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 5; see also infra note 125 and accompanying text.
17. See Leary, Bi-Polar Disorder?, supra note 15, at 54-55 (noting that, although
most Arctic bioprospecting occurs within areas of national jurisdiction, bioprospecting
activities in the limited areas beyond national jurisdiction nonetheless represent an
important emerging issue); Rosemary Rayfuse, Protecting Marine Biodiversity in Polar
Areas Beyond NationalJurisdiction, 17 RECIEL 3, 10 (2008) (observing that only a small
portion of the Arctic seabed is beyond all jurisdiction); see also LEARY, UNU-IAS REPORT,
supra note 3, at 7. For further discussion of territorial limits and EEZs under the United
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existing international regulatory framework-which includes the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 18 and the Convention on Biological Diversity' 9-was instituted prior to the development of the MGR biotechnology industry and, thus, does not provide nations with adequate
guidance concerning the issues of deep-sea MGR access or benefit sharing. 20 Though the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) provides participating nations with ownership rights over the resources within their
national boundaries, 2 ' the CBD does not provide a binding solution for
extraterritorial resources. 2 2 Additionally, the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)-the most directly relevant treaty-does
not contain any provisions for living organisms in the deep-seabed or the
high seas-only for mineral resources. 2 3 Furthermore, neither the
Antarctic Treaty System nor the Helsinki Treaty 24 -the relevant framework
for resources in the Antarctic and Arctic regions, respectively 2 5 -provide
26
any answers to the questions that polar MGRs pose.
At present, there is no consensus among nations with an economic
stake in the outcome of MGR access and benefit-sharing regulation as to
how to fill the gaps in the current regulatory framework. 2 7 Part of the
difficulty in achieving a consensus stems from a conflict among developed
and developing nations regarding the status of the genetic information
derived from MGRs. 2 8 Due to the large technological expenses associated
with bioprospecting in these extreme environments, developed nations currently have a stronghold on MGR research. 29 Consequently, nations such
as the United States, Canada, and Japan support the traditional property
rule of capture, which provides that the first nation to discover and appropriate the genetic resources retains ownership of the resulting informaNations Convention on the Law of the Sea, see infra notes 124-131 and accompanying
text.
18. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
19. See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter CBD]; Zewers, supra note 13, 153-54.
20. Zewers, supra note 13, at 168-70.
21. See CBD, supra note 19, art. 15.
22. See Donald K. Anton, Law for the Sea's Biological Diversity, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 341, 355-56 (1997).
23. See David R. Downes et al., International Environmental Law, 42 INT'L LAW. 285,
288 (2008); see also UNCLOS, supra note 18.
24. Treaty of Cooperation Between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, Mar. 23, 1962 [hereinafter Helsinki Treaty].
25. See Leary, Bi-Polar Disorder?, supra note 15, at 42, 49.
26. See, e.g., id. at 41, 47-48.
27. See Juan Manuel G6mez-Robledo & Robert Hill, Letter from the Co-Chairpersons of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group to Study Issues Relating to the
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity Beyond Areas of
National Jurisdiction to the President of the General Assembly, Annex, 9 36, U.N. Doc.
A/63/79 (May 16, 2008).
28. See Zewers, supra note 13, at 170-73.
29. See Melissa Weber, Accreditation as a Regulatory Option for Antarctic Bioprospecting, 42 PoLAR REC. 349, 350 (2006); Zewers, supra note 13, at 151.
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tion. 30 In contrast, developing nations argue that MGRs are part of the
common heritage of mankind and that resulting genetic information, and
any benefits that result from that information, should be available to the
31
entire world.
This Note will examine the developing interaction between extraterritorial MGR regulation and the Arctic and Antarctic regions by first identifying the shortcomings of the current regulatory framework for polar MGR
access and benefit sharing and, second, by analyzing the potential impact
that proposed MGR regulatory measures could have on the polar regions.
Part I of this Note will examine why polar MGR research and use are
important emerging fields and how they interact with intellectual property
laws domestically and internationally. Part II will identify specific gaps in
the existing regulatory framework with respect to extraterritorial MGR
access and benefit sharing in the polar regions. Part III will examine the
highly political nature of genetic resource control arguments and summarize the current state of debates among developed and developing nations.
Finally, Part IV will assess the viability of a number of gap-filling measures
that United Nations delegates proposed at the 2008 meeting of the Ad Hoc
Open-Ended Informal Working Group tasked with determining the legal
status of MGRs and how each of these options could impact regulation in
the polar regions. In particular, Part IV will examine the possibility of
amending the existing framework, implementing short-term actions, establishing or modifying regional MGR rights management projects, creating a
new international regulatory instrument, or maintaining the status quo of
the rule of capture.
I.

The Significance of Polar Region MGRs

A.

Polar Regions and the Deep Sea Habitat

Although rainforests are biodiversity hotspots, the world's oceans
make the rainforests seem barren by comparison. 32 The oceans contain an
overwhelming majority of the world's total biomass, with microorganisms
representing more than 95% of that amount. 33 The deep seabed is home to
an enormous number of species, particularly around hydrothermal
vents. 34 Scientists have discovered more than 500 species of organisms at
vent sites, 80%-90% of which were previously unknown. 3 5 Vent sites also
contain the highest level of microbial diversity on earth. 3 6 Despite the
30. See
supra note
31. See
32. See
33. See

34. See

McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 319-22 (explaining the rule of capture); Zewers,
13, at 172-73 (discussing the position of developed nations).
Zewers, supra note 13, at 170-72.
LEAY, DEEP SEA, supra note 4, at 14.
BROAD, supra note 5, at 46; LEARY, UNU-IAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.
LEARY, DEEP SEA,

35. See id.
36. See id.

supra note 4, at 15-16.
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enormous potential for scientific discoveries in the oceans, 37 scientists
have investigated less than 0.001% of the deep seabed. 38
The vast array of biodiversity in the deep seas is surprising because, at
first glance, the environment appears harsh and inhospitable. 3 9 Ninety
percent of the ocean's waters are five degrees Celsius or colder, including
the polar seas and the deep seabed. 40 In contrast to the extreme cold, the
temperature surrounding hydrothermal vents can exceed 350 degrees Celsius. 4 1 Additionally, the water surrounding hydrothermal vents can contain high levels of naturally occurring, but toxic, heavy metals that create
extremely acidic pH levels. 42 Despite these adverse environmental conditions, the microorganisms that thrive in the extreme environments of the
polar region deep seas have many special adaptations. 43 As part of the
ongoing International Polar Year, 44 scientists are currently conducting a
comprehensive census of marine life in the polar regions to document the
multitude of species that have developed such adaptations to the similar
environments of the Arctic and Antarctic regions. 4 5 The genetic bases for
these adaptations are what scientists studying MGRs hope to uncover.
B. Polar MGR Research and Commercial Applications
Many countries have devoted substantial funding to MGR bioprospecting missions in the polar regions, both within sovereign waters and in areas
beyond all national jurisdictions. For example, the Norwegian government established a National Plan for Functional Genomics (the FUGE Programme) in 2002 to conduct bioprospecting missions in the Arctic and to
37. Some scientists believe that studying the unique biochemistry of hydrothermal
vent ecosystems will help them understand the origins of life on Earth and will aid in the
search for life on Mars and other planets. See id. at 18-23.
38. See id. at 14.
39. See id. at 7-8 (describing the traditional perception of the deep sea as evil and
foreboding).

40. See LEARY, UNU-IAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 9 (citing R.Y. Morita, Psychrophilic
Bacteria, 39 BACTERIOLOGICAL REVS. 144 (1975)).
41. See LEARY, DEEP SEA, supra note 4, at 11.
42. See id. at 159.
43. See LEARY, UNU-IAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.
44. The International Polar Year is an internationally coordinated series of intense
research missions in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. See U.S. Geological Survey, International Polar Year 2008-Description and History, http://international.usgs.gov/ipy/
history.shtml (last visited Oct. 8, 2009). The goal of the event is for participating
nations to combine their resources and knowledge to conduct large-scale cooperative
research projects that individual nations would be unable to achieve alone. See
id. Though originally intended to last from 2007-2008, the latest Year was extended
until March 2009 due to the success of the first twelve months. See id. The 2007-2008
event marked the fourth International Polar Year, the first being in 1882-1883 and the
last in 1957-1958. See id.
45. See Press Release, Census of Marine Life, Polar Bears and Penguins May Live at
Opposite Poles, But Census of Marine Life Explorers Find Hundreds of Identical Species
Thrive in Both Arctic and Antarctic (Feb. 15, 2009), available at http://www.coml.org/
comlfiles/press/CoML IceOceansPublicRelease_02.15.2009.pdf.
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exploit the MGRs within its territorial waters and EEZ. 4 6 Within the first
year of the program's operation, the government invested approximately
C17.5 million in the search for enzymes, enzyme inhibitors, antioxidants,
47
and immune modulators.
The primary actors carrying out bioprospecting missions are nation48
ally funded scientific research organizations and academic institutions.
A major goal of these bioprospecting missions is to locate MGRs with adaptations that will have therapeutic or commercial value, such as the ability
to produce enzymes that can function at very high or very low temperatures (known as extremophiles). 4 9 This Part will discuss a few examples of
the numerous commercial applications of polar MGRs.
1.

Health Care

An example of the high commercial profitability of "extremophilic"
enzymes in the health care industry is the DNA polymerase enzyme
Thermus aquaticus.5 0

This enzyme is capable

of withstanding the

extremely high temperatures of the heating cycles used in the polymerase
chain reaction-a biochemical process that plays an important role in medical diagnoses and forensics by facilitating DNA replication.5 1 The exclusive world rights to the enzyme belong to a single Swiss pharmaceutical
company, and annual sales of the enzyme itself are as high as $100 million.5

2

In the United States alone, this one enzyme is the foundation of a

53
$300 million industry.
MGRs also have been the source of many medicines, including "hormonal modulators, antioxidant, antiviral[ ], anti-inflammatory, anti-fungal,

46. See Leary, Bi-Polar Disorder?, supra note 15, at 47-48; see also infra notes
129-137 and accompanying text for a discussion of territorial boundary limits under
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
47. See Leary, Bi-PolarDisorder?, supra note 15, at 47-48.
48. ARico & SALPIN, supra note 2, at 16-19 (describing various deep-seabed research
programs throughout the world); Leary, Bi-PolarDisorder?,supra note 15, at 47-48. But
see U.N. Informal Consultative Process on Oceans & the Law of the Sea, June 25-29,
2007, An Update on Marine Genetic Resources: Scientific Research, Commercial Uses and a
Databaseon Marine Bioprospecting, § 1.2 [hereinafter Marine Genetic Resources], available at http://www.ias.unu.edu/resource-centre/Marine%20Genetic%2Resources%20
UNU-IAS%20Report.pdf (noting that some private companies have provided funding for
scientific organizations' missions).
49. For a useful summary of the stages of the bioprospecting process from collection
to sales and marketing of the resulting products, see LEARY, DEEP SEA, supra note 4, at
164-69.
50. See DAGMAR LOHAN & SAM JOHNSTON, UNITED NATIONS UNIV-INST. ADVANCED
STUDIES, THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR BIOPROSPECTING: EXISTING POLICIES AND EMERGING
ISSUES

FOR

ANTARCTICA

10

(2003), available at http://www.ias.unu.edu/binaries/

UNUIAS AntarcticaReport.pdf.
51. See id.; The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon Oceans and the
Law of the Sea, 164, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/62/66 (Mar. 12,
2007) [hereinafter Secretary-General Report].
52. See LOHAN &JOHNSTON, supra note 50, at 10. These figures have likely increased
dramatically since their initial publication date. At the time, the forecast for market
expansion was approximately 15%-20% per year. See id.
53. Id.
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anti-HIV, antibiotic, anti[-]cancer, anti-tuberculosis and anti[-]malarial
drugs."5 4 One such drug is the chemotherapy agent, cytarabine, which
comes from a marine sponge and is highly effective in treating various
forms of leukemia and lymphoma.5 5 Similarly, researchers have found
that salinosporamide-a bioactive molecule from bacteria that live in
marine sediment-is a highly effective anti-cancer agent and currently are
conducting Phase I trials on humans.5 6 Other examples of MGR-derived
anti-cancer and antiviral drugs include bryostatin-1, halichondrin B, and
dolastatin-10. 57 Researchers believe that compounds such as these will
"revolutionize cancer treatment" by "disrupting tumor-specific cell signaling, cell division, energy metabolism, gene expression, [and] drug
58
resistance."
2.

Industrial Uses

The global market for industrial enzymes is approximately $50 billion
a year with recent annual increases of 3%-5%.59 Applications of these
enzymes are varied. 60 Many industries capitalize on the unique adaptations of hydrothermal vent microbes by using them to treat industrial waste
products and to desulphurize oil and coal. 61 The paper goods manufacturing industry utilizes one enzyme that researchers derived from a hydrother62
mal vent microorganism to facilitate starch liquefaction.
The food industry also incorporates enzymes from Arctic marine bacteria into its production processes. 63 For example, the dairy industry
utilizes cold-active beta-galactosidase to reduce the lactose content of milk
and cold-active lipases to accelerate fermentation in cheese, beer, and
dough products. 64 Additionally, one species of Antarctic fish contains a
unique glycoprotein-a substance that has similar properties to anti66
freeze 6 5-that helps prolong the shelf life of some frozen food products.
54. Secretary-GeneralReport, supra note 51,
164.
55. See Marine Genetic Resources, supra note 48, § 2.1; see also Jamal M. Arif et al.,
Novel Marine Compounds: Anticancer or Genotoxic?, 2 J. BIOMEDICINE & BIOTECHNOLOGY

93, 93 (2004).
56. See Secretary-GeneralReport, supra note 51, 1 164 (citing Robert H. Feling et al.,
SalinosporamideA: A Highly Cytotoxic Proteasome Inhibitorfrom a Novel Microbial Source,
A Marine Bacterium of the New Genus Salinospora, 42 ANGEWANDTE CHEMIE INT'L EDITION

355, 355-57 (2003)).
57. See id.; see also Marine Genetic Resources, supra note 48, § 2.1. For a comprehensive list of MGR-derived anti-cancer agents, see Thomas E. Adrian, Novel Marine-Derived
Anti-Cancer Agents, 13 CURRENT PHARMACEUTICAL DESIGN 3417 (2007).

58. See Marine Genetic Resources, supra note 48, § 2.1.
59. See id. § 4.3.
60. See Patrick Lorenz & Jurgen Eck, Metagenomics and Industrial Applications, 3
NATURE REVS.: MICROBIOLOGY 510, 510 (2005) ("Enzymes are used in a wide range of

applications and industries.").
61. See Marine Genetic Resources, supra note 48, § 4.5
62. See id. § 4.3, box 2 (noting that the annual market for this enzyme is approximately $150 million).
63.
64.
65.
66.

See
See
See
See

LEARY, UNU-IAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
id.
Leary, Bi-Polar Disorder?, supra note 15, at 41.
id.
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Bioremediation

Arctic and Antarctic MGRs also show promise for bioremediation
tasks such as cleaning up oil spills, contaminated soil, and other environmental pollutants. 67 Researchers have found that some marine microorganisms that can degrade petroleum and other chemicals that naturally seep
out of cracks in the deep seabed also are well suited for bioremediation in
the polar regions. 68 For example, marine cyanobacteria are able to filter
out chemical waste and heavy metals, such as cadmium and cobalt, from
69
industrial effluents before the pollutants reach the environment.
Researchers also believe that cold-adapted MGRs will provide a more costefficient remedy for the widespread hydrocarbon fuel pollution surround70
ing Arctic mining sites and scientific and military bases.
4.

Cosmeceuticals

Many MGR byproducts have contributed to a new and highly profitable subset of the cosmetics industry that focuses on products known as
cosmeceuticals. 7 1 A cosmeceutical product is a "cosmetic product that
claims to or has been found to have biologic activity."'72 Examples of cosmeceutical products using MGR byproducts include anti-aging creams that
contain pseudopterosin-an anti-inflammatory chemical that sea fans produce. 73 Additionally, some skin, hair, and nail treatment products contain
a glycoprotein from the Antarctic bacteria, Pseudoalteromonas antarctica,
which promotes healing. 74 AGI Dermatics and Phytomer-a French company that specializes in marine cosmetics-are among the many companies
75
that market cosmeceutical products containing MGR byproducts.
C.

A Brief Look at Patentability Standards in the United States and
Abroad

The primary form of ownership for MGR-derived products comes
from patents. 76 Based on a survey of their respective patent application
67. See

LEARY,

UNU-IAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-14.

68. See id.; Glowka, supra note 4, 349 n.98.
69. See Secretary-GeneralReport, supra note 51, 9 168.
70. See

LEARY,

UNU-IAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-14.

71. The estimated global market for the cosmeceutical industry is $6 billion. Daniel
Putterman, IncorporatingGenetic Resource Utilization into ICZM- Policies and Institutions
in Jamaica, in INTEGRATED COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT OF
MODELING 175, 178 (Kent Gustavson et al. eds., 2000).

CORAL REEFS: DECIsION SUPPORT

72. Deborah E. Mason, Note, Kiss and Make-up: A Need For Consolidationof FDA and
Cosmetic Industry Regulation Programs, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 181, 183 (2008) (quoting
Melissa C. Lazarus & Leslie S. Baumann, The Use of Cosmeceutical Moisturizers, 14 DERMATOLOGIC THERAPY 200, 200 (2001)).
73. Id.
74. See LoHAN & JOHNSTON, supra note 50, at 7; Antarticine-NF3 for the Treatment

and Re-Epithelialisation of Wounds, Patent ES2181592 (published Feb. 16, 2003), available at http://v3.espacenet.com/publicationDetails/biblio?DB=EPODOC&adjacent=
True&locale=ENEP&FT=D&date=20030216&CC=ES&NR=2181592A1&KC=A1.
75. See Marine Genetic Resources, supra note 48, § 4.4.
76. See Zewers, supra note 13, at 158.
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databases, the United States and the European Union (EU) have approved
at least thirty-seven patents for deep-sea MGR products, 77 thirty-one of
which were from the Arctic region. 78 With regard to Antarctic-derived
products, Japanese companies represent the largest portion of patent applications, 79 followed by German companies. 80 This section provides a brief
examination of the patentability standards that inventors must satisfy to
acquire patent protection for their discoveries in both the United States and
abroad.
In the United States, intellectual property laws grant exclusive patent
rights for twenty years from the date of filing to anyone who "invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." 8 1 The
Supreme Court clarified the threshold for patentability in the landmark
case Diamond v. Chakrabarty.8 2 The case arose when Chakrabarty, a scientist, attempted to patent a type of superbacteria that he created through

83
recombinant DNA technology to process and breakdown crude oil, simi-

lar to bioremediation MGRs. 8 4 The Court upheld the patentability of
Chakrabarty's creation and ruled that "anything under the sun that is
made by man" is patentable, including a live, human-made microorganism. 85 The Federal Circuit provided additional guidance in AmGen v.
Chugai Pharmaceuticals by ruling that isolated and purified gene
sequences are patentable, though genes as part of naturally occurring
chromosomes are not.8 6 Because MGR DNA derivative patents are isolated
and purified gene sequences that are separate from the naturally occurring
marine organisms, they satisfy the basic threshold for patentability and
usually will be upheld, provided that the "invention" meets the additional
77. Marine Genetic Resources, supra note 48, § 3.2. For a breakdown of the percentages attributable to constituent nations, see LEARY, UNU-IAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 22.
78. See LEARY, UNU-IAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 22.
79. ARICO & SALPIN, supra note 2, at 29.
80. Id. Examples of companies that have applied for patents derived from Antarctic
marine genetic resources include Bayer AG (Germany), Henkel KGAA (Germany),
SmithKline Beecham, Astra, Novonordisk (Denmark), Du Pont (United States), Chisso
Corporation (Japan), Loders Croklaan (The Netherlands), Haarmann & Reimer GmbH
(Germany), Unilever (United Kingdom), Lysi HF (Iceland), DSM NV (The Netherlands),
Jujo Paper Co. Ltd. Uapan), Mitsubishi Gas Chemical Company Inc. (Japan),
Higashimaru Shoyu Company Ltd. (Japan), Tokuyama Corporation (Japan), Lion Corporation (Japan), and Nippon Soda Company Ltd. (Japan). Id.
81. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 154(a)(1)-(2) (2008).
82. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
83. See id. at 305.
84. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
85. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309 (distinguishing human-made products and processes
from the laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas).
86. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert.
denied sub nom. Genetics Inst. v. Amgen, Inc., 502 U.S. 856 (1991) (approving the patentability of the purified isolated DNA sequence that codes for the naturally-occurring
human protein, erythropoietin, which boosts red blood cell counts and has a significant
commercial market for pharmaceutical companies).
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requirements of utility and novelty.8 7
Although international patent protection varies according to each
nation's standards, international organizations have made some efforts to
align those standards. 88 The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is an international agreement intended to
coordinate the World Trade Organization member states' intellectual property laws.8 9 Under TRIPS, member states are able to set their own patentability standards, with only minimal requirements. 90 Some permissible
exclusions to patentability exist in order to protect the larger goals of public order and morality, such as protecting human, animal, or plant health
and environmental integrity. 9 1 For example, TRIPS allows member states
to refuse patents for plants and animals as well as the biological production
processes for those organisms. 9 2 Microorganisms, however, are excluded
from that provision; member states cannot refuse equitable patent protection for microorganisms and non-biological and microbiological
processes. 93 Once a patent is issued, under TRIPS, the patent owner will
have exclusive rights to that "invention" and can prevent third parties in
94
other nations from using that process or product.
87. See Zewers, supra note 13, at 161; see also In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (reinforcing the substantial and specific utility requirements for patentability by rejecting a patent for a purified DNA strand of maize that lacked specific
utility).
88. See Zewers, supra note 13, at 159.
89. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]; Zewers, supra note 13, at 159. TRIPS was
enacted in 1994 as a result of the Uruguay Round of negotiations that also established
the WTO. See CHRISTOPHER MAY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE NEW ENCLOSURES? 68 (2000).
90. See TRIPS, supra note 89, art. 27(1) (stating that "patents shall be available for
any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that
they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application"); Carlos
M. Correa, Internationalization of the Patent System and New Technologies, 20 Wis. INT'L
LJ. 523, 548 (2002).
91. See TRIPS, supra note 89, art. 27; G. GREGORY LETTERMAN, BASICS OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 178 (2001); MAY, supra note 89, at 74.
92. See TRIPS, supra note 89, art. 27; LETTERMAN, supra note 91, at 178. Examples of
countries that have refused to extend patent protection to plants and animals include
Brazil, India, and Norway. See Sabrina Safrin, Hyperownership in a Time of Biotechnological Promise: The InternationalConflict to Control the Building Blocks of Life, 98 AM.J. INT'L
L. 641, 645 n.24 (2004).
93. See TRIPS, supra note 89, art. 27; LETTERMAN, supra note 91, at 178; Correa, supra
note 90, at 548. In fact, most developed countries have issued patents for microorganisms, genetically modified plants and animals, and isolated and purified genes and
genetic sequences. See Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and InternationalLaw, 42 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 47, 62-65 (2001).
94. See TRIPS, supra note 89, art. 28(1) ("A patent shall confer on its owner the
following exclusive rights: (a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having the owner's consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product; (b) where the subject
matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having the owner's consent
from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or
importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by that process."); see
also infra notes 159-170 and accompanying text for a discussion of how this potentially
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II. The Current Regulatory Framework
There are a number of treaties that are relevant to the regulation of
polar MGR access and benefit sharing. 95 As discussed earlier, in addition
to TRIPS, four major regulatory documents touch upon the issues of access
and ownership but do not provide any guidance for how to deal with
emerging ownership issues in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. 9 6 This Part
will examine the coverage of the Antarctic Treaty System, the Helsinki
Treaty, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, and will discuss the treaties' shortcomings in addressing extraterritorial polar MGRs.
A.

The Antarctic Treaty System

The first relevant regulatory document is the Antarctic Treaty, which is
part of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS)-a series of treaties regulating
access to and activities in the Antarctic region, including all ice shelves and
land below 60 degrees south latitude. 97 Signatories of the Antarctic Treaty
include Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, South Africa, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. 98
The Antarctic Treaty limits extension of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica and encourages member states to cooperate with each other by
exchanging information about relevant scientific observations and
results. 99 However, the Treaty was signed in 1959 and went into effect in
1961,100 well before the existence of technology to conduct large-scale
genetic research or the formation of the international biotechnology industry.1 01 Thus, the Antarctic Treaty does not provide further guidance on the
can hinder scientific progress, a phenomenon known as the "Tragedy of the
Anticommons."
95. See, e.g., CBD, supra note 19; UNCLOS, supra note 18; Helsinki Treaty, supra
note 24; Antarctic Treaty art. VI, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.

96. See CBD, supra note 19; UNCLOS, supra note 18; Helsinki Treaty, supra note 24;
Antarctic Treaty, supra note 95.
97. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 95, art. VI. Additional treaties within the Antarctic
Treaty System primarily address environmental concerns. See Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1455 (entered into force
Jan. 14, 1998); Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources,
May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, 1329 U.N.T.S. 47; Convention for the Conservation of
Antarctic Seals, opened for signatureFeb. 11, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441, 11 I.L.M. 251 (entered
into force Mar. 11, 1978); Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and
Flora, June 13, 1964, 17 U.S.T. 992 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1982), reprinted in 1
W.M. BUSH, ANTARCTICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF INTER-STATE AND
NATIONAL DOCUMENTS 146-69 (1982).
98. For a current list of member states, see Parties to the Antarctic Treaty System,
http://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats-parties.aspx?lang=E (last visited Oct. 8, 2009) [hereinafter List of Parties].
99. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 95, art. IlI.
100. Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, The Antarctic Treaty, http://www.ats.aq/e/
atsjtreaty.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2009).

101. See Bernard P. Herber, Bioprospecting in Antarctica: The Search for a Policy
Regime, 42 POLAR REC. 139, 143 (2006).

2009

A Polarizing Dilemma

issue of bioprospecting or MGRs. 10 2 Some scholars are concerned that the
emerging biotechnology industry and the search for MGRs will challenge
the implicit assumption of the Treaty that Antarctica is an internationally
shareable resource. 10 3 Despite these concerns and the growing importance of MGR access and benefit sharing, there does not appear to be any
10 4
impetus to reform the ATS to address that issue.
B. The Helsinki Treaty
The Arctic polar region has a very different legal and regulatory regime
than Antarctica.' 0 5 Although there are a number of treaties that affect the
Arctic nations, the most relevant to the issues of MGR access and benefit
sharing is the Treaty of Cooperation-also known as the Helsinki Treatybetween Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, which the
nations passed in 1962 and substantially amended in 1971.106 The Treaty
encourages legal, social, economic, cultural, and environmental cooperation between the Nordic nations and established the Nordic Council and
Nordic Council of Ministers. 10 7 The broad category of genetic resources
falls under the joint jurisdiction of the Nordic Council of Ministers for
Fisheries, Agriculture, Forestry, and Food and the Nordic Council of Ministers for Environmental Issues. 10 8 Both of these Councils consult with the
Nordic Gene Resources Council, an organization that focuses on cooperation between Nordic countries regarding access to genetic resources,
knowledge transfer, and capacity building, and is responsible for organizing research and development of genetic resources in the region. 10 9 Unfortunately, despite the Councils' awareness of the political, environmental,
and economic importance of genetic resource access and benefit sharing,
their primary focus has been on territorial genetic resources, and they have
not yet addressed the issue of Arctic MGRs located beyond national
jurisdictions. 10
102. See

LOHAN &JOHNSTON, supra note 50, at 11, 13.
103. See Leary, Bi-Polar Disorder?, supra note 15, at 42; see also JOHN
GLOBAL COMMONS:

A

REGIME ANALYSIS

VOGLER, THE

8 (1995) (arguing that signatories never consid-

ered the marine resources associated with Antarctica to be part of the common heritage
of mankind).
104. Herber, supra note 101, at 144.
105. Compare Antarctic Treaty, supra note 95, with Helsinki Treaty, supra note 24.
106. See Helsinki Treaty, supra note 24.
107. See id. arts. 39-67. The Nordic Council was established in 1952 and serves as
the forum for parliamentary cooperation among member states, whereas the Nordic
Council of Ministers (which was formed in 1971) is actually compromised of many
councils that serve as the fora for Nordic governmental cooperation on issues such as
Business, Energy, and Regional Affairs; Fishery, Agriculture, Forestry and Food Affairs;
and Environmental Affairs. See Leary, Bi-Polar Disorder?, supra note 15, at 49 & n.93.
108. See Leary, Bi-Polar Disorder?, supra note 15, at 49.
109. Id. at 50.
110. Id.
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The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity

The next relevant treaty is the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The United Nations adopted the CBD in 1992 and it
became effective in 1993.111 The Convention aims to conserve biological
diversity through sustainable use and fair and equitable sharing of benefits
stemming from that use. 1 2 An underlying goal of the CBD is to encourage
the exchange of resources-both natural and economic-between Northern
and Southern member states: in exchange for access to the Southern
nations' abundant natural resources, Northern nations provide economic
enrichment. 113
Unlike the Antarctic Treaty System and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the CBD directly addresses the issue of access to
genetic resources. 114 It encourages member states to facilitate other states'
access to genetic resources and requires prior informed consent before
accessing another state's resources. 115 Although the CBD provides a clear
set of rules governing access to genetic resources, these rules only apply to
genetic resources located within a nation's jurisdiction. 1 6 An additional
shortcoming of the CBD is that it only deals with access issues, not ownership, which remains under the purview of international and national
laws. 11 7 Furthermore, the United States has not ratified the CBD and,
thus, is not bound by its rules. 18
D.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

Although the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) is a comprehensive and ground-breaking treaty governing member states' access to and activities on the seas, it does not address MGR
access and benefit sharing. This "constitution for the oceans" 1 19 provides
guidelines and regulations for member states regarding, inter alia, the limits of the territorial sea, navigation, conservation of marine biodiversity,
land-locked states' right of access to and from the sea, marine scientific
research, and dispute settlements. 120 The 157 nations that have signed the
treaty to date include many land-locked and developing nations from all
111. See LOHAN &JOHNSTON, supra note 50, at 17. For a list of parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, see http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2009).
112. CBD, supra note 19.
113. See Daniel Rettig, In Search of Pirate's Treasure: The Control and Ownership of
Genetic Resources in the Mesoamerican BarrierReef System, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.

261, 268 (2006).
114. CBD, supra note 19, art. 15.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 307.
118. See List of Parties, supra note 98.
119. Tommy T.B. Koh, President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea, Remarks, A Constitution for the Oceans (Dec. 11, 1982), available at http://
www.un.org/Depts/los/convention agreements/texts/koh-english.pdf (adapted from
statements by Koh at the final session of the Conference at Montego Bay).
120. UNCLOS, supra note 18.
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regions of the globe. 121 One notable absence from the list of signatories is
the United States; 12 2 although the United States has approved Part XI of
mineral
UNCLOS-a special provision pertaining to deep seabed 123
resources-it has not approved the remainder of the Convention.
Parts II through VII of UNCLOS divide the seas into relevant regions of
demarcation. First there is the territorial sea, which extends twelve miles
from a nation's coastline; 124 second is the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),
which extends up to "200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured;"' 12 5 third is the continental shelf,
which excludes the deep seabed and can extend up to 350 nautical miles
from territorial sea baseline; 126 and lastly there are the high seas, the
region beyond the EEZ to which all States have the freedom to access and
12 7
conduct scientific research.
Within their own EEZs, coastal nations have discretion to determine
levels of activities such as fishing and conservation measures. 128 Articles
121. Div. for Ocean Affairs & the Law of the Sea, Office of the Legal Affairs, Status of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of PartXI of the Convention and of the Agreement for the Implementation of
the Provisions of the Convention Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Oct. 1, 2009), available at http://
www.un.org/Depts/los/reference-files/status2008.pdf.
122. Id.
123. See id. Despite its historical non-participation in UNCLOS, the United States
might soon ratify the full treaty. On January 12, 2009, President George W. Bush issued
a National Security and Homeland Security Presidential Directive regarding the future of
the United States' Arctic policy. In this document, the President urged the Senate to
accede to UNCLOS to protect U.S. national security interests and reinforce the nation's
sovereign rights over the natural resources within its jurisdictional boundaries. See Presidential Directive on Arctic Region Policy, 45 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 47 (Jan. 9, 2009)
[hereinafter Presidential Directive], available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
Furgetdoc.cgi?dbname=2009_presidential documents&docid=pdl9ja09_txt-I 1.pdf.
thermore, although the future of the United States' Arctic policy under President
Obama's administration remains undetermined at the time of publication, it appears
likely that the administration will follow the same trend that President Bush established
in his last days in office. In a speech before the joint meeting of the Arctic Council and
the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the
Antarctic Treaty, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasized the importance of continuing research in and increasing attention to both the Arctic and Antarctic regions and,
most significantly, the United States' accession to UNCLOS. See Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks at the Joint Session of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Meeting and the Arctic Council (Apr. 6, 2009), transcriptavailable at http://www.state.
gov/secretary/rm/2009a/04/121314.htm ("The changes underway in the Arctic will
have long-term impacts on our economic future, our energy future, and indeed, again,
the future of our planet. So it is crucial that we work together. Here in Washington, the
State Department coordinates Arctic policy for the United States, and I am committed to
maintaining a high level of engagement with our partners on this. That starts with the
Law of the Sea Convention, which President Obama and I are committed to ratifying, to
give the United States and our partners the clarity we need to work together smoothly
and effectively in the Arctic region.").
124. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 3.
125. Id. art. 57.
126. Id. art. 76.
127. Id. art. 86.
128. Id. art. 62.
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69 and 70 of UNCLOS give land-locked and geographically disadvantaged
states the right to participate "in the exploitation of an appropriate part of
the surplus of the living resources" of the EEZs of coastal states in the same
region on an equitable basis, as established through agreements with the
coastal states. 129 Thus, UNCLOS provides a clear framework for owner130
ship of MGRs located within the aforementioned regions of the seas.
However, because the new wave of MGR bioprospecting is occurring in
Antarctica and regions of the Arctic, these traditional demarcations do not
provide any guidance.131

A recent addition to UNCLOS is Part XI, which attempts to fill in some
of the gaps left by the original regional demarcations. 132 Part XI describes
"the Area" which encompasses the deep seabed and subsoil beyond any
national jurisdiction. 13 3 Part XI also established the International Seabed
Authority to coordinate and control activities of member states in the
Area. 13 4 Most importantly, Part XI decrees that the resources of the Area
are the common heritage of mankind:
1. No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any
part of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridical
person appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights nor such appropriation shall be recognized.
2. All rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole,
on whose behalf the Authority shall act. These resources are not subject to
alienation. The minerals recovered from the Area, however, may only be
alienated in accordance with this Part and the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority.
3. No State or natural or juridical person shall claim, acquire or exercise
rights with respect to the minerals recovered from the Area except in accordance with this Part. Otherwise,135no such claim, acquisition or exercise of
such rights shall be recognized.
Part XI also requires the "equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from activities in the Area through any appropriate
mechanism, on a non-discriminatory basis."'1 3 6 Although the location of
contentious MGRs falls within the Area, Part XI's rules only apply to "solid,
liquid or gaseous mineral resources" in the Area, not living organisms. 13 7
Another recent addition to UNCLOS is Part XIII which deals with
129. Id. art. 69.
130. But see Leary, Bi-Polar Disorder?, supra note 15, at 52-54, for a discussion of
how some Nordic countries are contesting the extent of Norway's EEZ and its sovereignty over the MGRs within that region.
131. See Herber, supra note 101, at 139, 142.
132. See Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, G.A. Res. 48/263, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/48/263 (Aug. 17, 1994).
133. See UNCLOS, supra note 18, pmbl.
134. Id. art. 156.
135. Id. art. 137.
136. Id. art. 140(2).
137. Id. art. 133(a).
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marine scientific research.' 38 Part XIII permits marine scientific research
in the Area but does not provide any guidelines for proprietary rights stemming from discoveries therefrom. 139 As a general principle, Part XIII
encourages member states to publish any information that their scientists
discover through marine scientific research in order to "actively promote
the flow of scientific data and information and the transfer of knowledge
resulting from marine scientific research, especially to developing
40
States."1
In its present form, UNCLOS does not provide any guidance on MGR
access and benefit sharing. 14 1 The primary difficulty is that MGRs are
neither mineral resources nor a measure of biodiversity and thus do not fit
into any of the categories covered by the treaty. 14 2 Furthermore, many of
the UNCLOS signatories, as well as the United States, are divided over how
to frame the MGR access and benefit-sharing question.' 4 3 The next part of
this Note will examine the various views on this subject.
III.
A.

The Politics of Genetic Resource Control
General Principles

To understand the current status of the debates over MGR access and
benefit sharing, it is useful first to place the debate in its larger political
and ideological context. Political discussions of genetic resource control
generally reflect four basic principles: 1) proprietarian intellectual property rights, 2) community intellectual property rights, 3) national sovereignty, and 4) the common heritage of mankind. 14 4 The dominant
principle in political discussions typically is proprietarian intellectual
property rights, a category that consists of both economistic and entitlement concerns.' 4 5 The former subcategory acts to promote society-wide
economic efficiency, whereas the latter aims to achieve morally correct
proprietarian arrangements of intellectual property rights. 14 6 The
proprietarian intellectual property rights principle closely relates to the
Western legal discourse and its individualistic frame of reference. 14 7 Consequently, developed nations, such as the United States, favor this
148
approach to genetic resource control measures.
The second and third principles associated with political discussions
of genetic resource control do not play significant roles in the current
debates on MGRs. The principle of community intellectual property rights
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See generally id. Part XIII.
See id. art. 256; see also id. art. 144.
Id. art. 244.
See generally id.; Downes et al., supra note 23, at 288.
See Downes et al., supra note 23, at 288.
G6mez-Robledo & Hill, supra note 27, T1 36-38.
See STENSON & GRAY, supra note 12, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
See infra Part II.B.
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focuses on the intellectual property rights of indigenous peoples over the
genetic resources in their traditional habitats.' 49 Because this Note focuses
on MGRs from the Arctic and Antarctic, which are located extraterritorially, this principle is not relevant to the current discussion. The third principle, national sovereignty, reflects the rights of nation-states to control the
genetic resources within their territory. 150 This Note does not address the
national sovereignty principle because the current international legal
regime-particularly UNCLOS-adequately addresses the issue of territorial MGRs.'

5

'

The final principle inherent in political discussions of genetic resource
control is the common heritage of mankind. This principle reflects the
idea that "humanity as a whole has a right to a share of the natural
resources of the world. ' 152 Third-world nations, as well as developed
nations without strong biotechnological industries, typically assert this
principle in order to share in the many benefits stemming from genetic
resource research and development. 1 53 The next two sections will demonstrate how the competing principles of proprietarian intellectual property
rights and the common heritage of mankind have led to entrenchment of
the two sides of the MGR access and benefit-sharing argument.
B. Developed Nations: Argument for the Rule of Capture
On one side of the MGR access and benefit-sharing argument are
developed nations, many of which have strong biotechnology industries or
the infrastructure to develop one.' 54 These nations generally favor the
traditional property law "rule of capture" for MGRs that grants ownership
to the first nation that appropriates a resource.' 55 Additionally, many
developed nations argue that Part XI of UNCLOS, the section regulating
activities in the Area, permits bioprospecting as a part of the high seas
freedom of scientific research. 1 56 In the alternative, these nations claim
149. See STENSON & GRAY, supra note 12, at 3.
150. See id. at 4.
151. See supra Part IID.
152. See STENSON & GRAY, supra note 12, at 4.
153. See id.; Peter Prows, Tough Love: The Dramatic Birth and Looming Demise of
UNCLOS Property Law (And What is to Be Done About It), 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 241, 291
(2007).
154. See Zewers, supra note 13, at 172.
155. See id.; see also McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 258.
156. See Report of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group to Study Issues
Relating to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity Beyond
Areas of NationalJurisdiction, 9 27, 72, U.N. Doc. A/61/65 (Mar. 20, 2006) (prepared
by Juan Manuel G6mez-Robledo & Philip D. Burgess) [hereinafter Report of the Ad Hoc
Working Group] ("Some delegations cautioned against trying to impose restrictions on
the freedom of marine scientific research. They recalled the principle of the Convention
dealing with the freedom of marine scientific research on the high seas and noted that
undue regulatory mechanisms would only inhibit the work of the scientific community
and impose difficulties on it."); Prows, supra note 153, at 291. But see Report of the Ad
Hoc Working Group, supra, 28 ("A number of other delegations emphasized that
marine scientific research should be conducted in conformity with the provisions contained in part XIII of [UNCLOS], in particular article 240 on general principles for the

2009

A Polarizing Dilemma

that UNCLOS does not apply to bioprospecting at all. 15 7 These arguments
158
support the concept of the rule of capture for MGRs.
Using the rule of capture as the guiding principle in MGR appropriation presents several problems. In addition to some nations objecting to
patenting living organisms and the building blocks of life on moral
grounds, 15 9 a common complaint that arises is that the rule of capture
encourages an "anticommons" situation.160 Contrary to Professor Garrett
Hardin's famous "Tragedy of the Commons" scenario, in which community
access to a finite resource leads to selfish use and overexploitation, 16 1 the
anticommons represents a situation in which many individuals rush to
enclose and protect resources from community use, leading to under-con162
sumption or suboptimal use of that resource.
The proliferation of gene sequence patents is a prime example of this
scenario. 16 3 In the United States, the first person to isolate a gene
sequence and successfully file a patent application can potentially prevent
the use of that sequence by "downstream" researchers, such as pharmaceutical companies or other major industries. 164 Downstream actors have the
option of trying to contract with the patent holder for the right to use the
sequence, but this option is not always successful and can lead to additional, and sometimes prohibitive, transactional costs. 1 65 Consequently,

critics allege that this method of patenting could lead to a dangerous
underdevelopment of medical treatments and useful industrial
66
processes.1
On an international scale, the tragedy of the anticommons potentially
could arise if one country discovers and appropriates a particular genetic
sequence from a marine organism with tremendous potential for industrial
processes or medical treatment.' 6 7 Under the traditional rule of capture,
the discovering nation could stand to benefit greatly from this situation to
the detriment of other nations. 166 The looming danger of the anticommons supports the idea of limiting appropriation of MGRs and making
conduct of marine scientific research and article 241, which provided that marine scientific research activities shall not constitute the legal basis of any claim to any part of the
environment and its resources.").
157. See Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 156, 11l 27-30, 72.
158. See Prows, supra note 153, at 291.
159. See Correa, supra note 90, at 548-49; see also Communication from Kenya on
Behalf of the African Group, Preparationsfor the 1999 Ministerial Conference: The TRIPS
Agreement, WT/GC/W/302 (Aug. 6, 1999).
160. See generally Safrin, supra note 92, at 652-58.
161. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
162. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REv. 621, 622 (1998); Safrin, supra note 92, at 652.
163. Safrin, supra note 92, at 653.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.; see also Correa, supra note 90, at 545-46.
167. See Safrin, supra note 92, at 652, 653, 657.
168. See Marine Genetic Resources, supra note 48, § 5.1; see also McLaughlin, supra
note 1, at 319-20, 322.
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them accessible to the entire world as the common heritage of mankind,1 69
especially because it appears there may already be an anticommons problem at the national level with regard to MGRs and terrestrial genetic
70
resources within the boundaries of national sovereignty.'
C.

Developing Nations: Argument for the Common Heritage of
Mankind

In 1967, Arvid Pardo, the Maltese Foreign Minister, delivered a speech
at the UN General Assembly emphasizing that the deep seabed should not
be appropriated by individual nations. 17 1 Instead, he argued that it was
the "common heritage of mankind" and that the world should share its
172
resources equitably through communal international management.
Many developing nations subscribe to Pardo's position in the current
debates over MGR access and benefit sharing. 173 These nations, including
the Group of 77 (G77) and China, argue that UNCLOS's principles of equitable sharing apply to MGRs and, consequently, any products derived from
174
MGRs should be the common heritage of mankind.
One way of achieving this approach to MGR access and benefit sharing is through the creation of databases containing the resulting genetic
information and governing legal regulations. 17 5 The United Nations University Institute for Advanced Studies is in the process of creating such a
database that will include up-to-date information on bioprospecting
projects in Antarctica, scientific research findings and commercial uses of
MGRs, and relevant legal rules. 176 Though the database appears promising, its success will depend on the cooperation of the developed nations
177
that hold the information at present.
IV.

Evaluating Possible Legal and Regulatory Gap-Filling Measures

In its final part, this Note will assess potential regulatory gap-filling
measures that could result from these debates regarding the MGR access
and benefit-sharing dilemma and will analyze how these measures could
affect the polar regions. Despite the complex legal status of MGRs, United
169. See Safrin, supra note 92, at 652-58.
170. See id. at 653-58.
171. See VOGLER, supra note 103, at 7.

172. See id.
173. See Gillian Joseph, Statement on Behalf of the Group of 77 and China at the
General Assembly Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group to Study Issues Relating to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity Beyond
Areas of National Jurisdiction (Apr. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Joseph Speech], available at
http://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=080428a. The Group of 77 was
established in 1964 and provides developing nations with a unified platform for negotiations within the General Assembly. See generally THE GROUP OF 77 AT THE UNITED
NATIONS (Mourad Ahmia ed., 3d ed. 2006).

174.
175.
176.
177.

See Joseph Speech, supra note 173.
See Marine Genetic Resources, supra note 48, § 7.2, app. 1.
Id.
See id. § 7.2.
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Nations delegates and international scholars have proposed a number of
possible solutions to the current debates among developed and developing
nations. In addition to regular meetings of the Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 178 the United Nations has developed an Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group to study issues
relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction, including ways to facilitate
access to and benefit sharing of MGRs. 1 79 At the Working Group's 2008
meeting, participating member states discussed various gap-filling measures to address this ongoing issue. 180 Though they primarily focused on
reforming UNCLOS, other options arose as well.' 8 ' Because the delegates
of the Working Group are examining the issue of MGRs beyond national
jurisdiction without special regard to any given region,' 8 2 the proposed
gap-filling measures could have varying effects on the Arctic and Antarctic
regions. 1 8 3 The following sections will evaluate the potential impact and
viability of some of these proposed measures, which fall into four general
categories: 1) reforms to the existing legal and regulatory framework, 2)
short-term actions, 3) regional institutional approaches, and 4) the creation
84
of a new legal instrument.'
A.

Reforming the Existing Regulatory Framework

The primary gap-filling measure that delegates discussed at the 2008
Working Group meeting was reforming the existing regulatory framework
to incorporate provisions for extraterritorial MGR access and benefit sharing. 1 8 5 Although there are a number of relevant regulatory and legal
instruments that, with appropriate amendments, could provide answers to
178. See Report on the Work of the United Nations Open-Ended Informal Consultative
Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 11 15-108, U.N. Doc. A/62/169 (July 30,
2007) (prepared by Lorraine Ridgeway & Cristian Macquieira) (summarizing the Process's 2007 discussions on marine genetic resources within and beyond national
jurisdiction).
179. The Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group was established pursuant to
G.A. Res. 59/24, 1 73, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/24 (Feb. 4, 2005).
180. See G6mez-Robledo & Hill, supra note 27, f9 36, 38.
181. See id. c 9 36, 37, 39.
73 (directing the Working Group to
182. See G.A. Res. 59/24, supra note 179,
examine MGRs generally); G6mez-Robledo & Hill, supra note 27, C91 (acknowledging
the Working Group's role to examine MGRs generally).
183. See, e.g., infra note 215 and accompanying text.
184. See A~ico & SALPIN, supra note 2, at 58-62 (identifying a range of feasible
approaches for regulating deep seabed bioprospecting activities); KRISTINA M. GJERDE ET
AL., OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING REGULATORY AND GOVERNANCE GAPS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
REGIME FOR THE CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF MARINE BIODIVERS1TY IN AREAS

BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION § 1.2 (2008), available at http://cmsdata.iucn.org/

downloads/iucnmarinepaper2.pdf (providing a parallel analysis of potential gap-filling measures in response to environmental conservation concerns regarding extraterritorial fisheries); Doris Konig, Genetic Resources of the Deep Sea-How Can They Be

Preserved?, in

INTERNATIONAL LAW TODAY: NEW CHALLENGES AND THE NEED FOR REFORM?

141 (Doris K6nig et al. eds., 2007) (discussing the range of options for protecting
biodiversity in areas beyond all jurisdiction.).
185. See GJERDE ET AL., supra note 184, at 1.
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these issues, the most likely candidate is UNCLOS.1 8 6 At the Working
Group meeting, UN member states agreed that UNCLOS is the most appropriate framework to govern MGR regulation. 18 7 The states, however, disagreed about how the Treaty's language should be amended and which
section of the Treaty would be most appropriate to regulate MGRs beyond
national jurisdiction: the Area (Part XI) or the High Seas (Part VII). 18 8
The outcome of the categorization debate could have serious ramifications for developing nations. If MGRs fall under the Area's purview, as the
G77 and China argue, the resources would be considered a part of the
common heritage of mankind and equitable benefit sharing would be
required.' 8 9 One advantage of this approach is that the International Seabed Authority, which Part XI established, could provide a ready-made and
operational solution for overseeing equitable access and benefit sharing.1 90
Two major obstacles to the efficacy of this approach would be the lengthy
negotiation process required to amend Part XI to encompass MGRs instead
of just mineral resources and the United States' continued refusal to ratify
the treaty in its entirety. 19 1
If, however, MGRs are considered part of the High Seas, the freedom
that attaches to nearly all activities in that region could remove the obligation of developed nations to share economic and informational benefits
from their discoveries. 19 2 Among the nations that believe that the High
Seas is the appropriate category for MGRs, some argue that the definition
of marine scientific research should be modified to include MGR bioprospecting, while others argue that bioprospecting is inherently distinct from
the broad category of marine scientific research.1 93 The former opinion
would entail that, under a new definition of marine scientific research,
MGRs would become part of the common heritage of mankind, whereas
94
the latter would support the rule of capture approach.1
Due to the Treaty's broad coverage of all activities on the seas, reforms
to UNCLOS would have similar impacts on MGR access and benefit sharing in both the Arctic and Antarctic regions.' 9 5 The potential economic
value of polar region MGRs could play a significant role in the negotiation
process by providing a strong incentive for developing nations to demand
an equitable share of the benefits from biotechnological developments via
186. See, e.g., Rettig, supra note 113, at 264-65 (focusing on CBD and TRIPS);
Zewers, supra note 13, at 151, 158-59 (examining the possibility of regulating MGR
benefit sharing through national and international patent laws).
187. G6mez-Robledo & Hill, supra note 27, 36.
188. Id.
189. SeeJoseph Speech, supra note 173; see also supra notes 132-136 and accompanying text.
190. See UNCLOS, supra note 18, arts. 1, 137; ARico & SALPIN, supra note 2, at 60.
191. ARICO & SALPIN, supra note 2, at 60-61; see also supra note 123 (noting that the
United States might soon accede to UNCLOS in its entirety).
192. See UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 86.
193. ARICO & SALPIN, supra note 2, at 37.

194. Id.
195. See UNCLOS, supra note 18, pmbl.

2009

A Polarizing Dilemma

classification of MGRs as the common heritage of mankind. 1 96 Furthermore, the powerful voting bloc of the G77 and China likely will pose a
substantial obstacle to developed nations' attempts to implement any mea19 7
sure that ignores developing nations' wishes.
B.

Short-Term Actions

In the absence of a panacea for the MGR access and benefit-sharing
regulation problems, various UN delegates and international scholars have
proposed a number of short-term, interim measures that could provide a
more equitable arrangement for developed and developing nations. 198 For
example, the EU suggested the implementation of an International Seabed
Authority Endowment Fund to help developing nations participate in and
benefit from MGR research and use. 199 Similarly, scholars have supported
the idea of requiring international MGR patent applicants to submit royalty
payments to an international trust fund as a condition of receiving patent
protection. 200

An additional short-term option to address MGR access and benefit
sharing is accreditation requirements for bioprospectors. 20 1 This measure
would require potential bioprospectors to register with an independent
organization and, if they meet certain predetermined requirements, receive
a "license" to carry out research missions in areas beyond national jurisdiction. 20 2 By keeping track of which nations have carried out MGR recovery
missions and, potentially, the results of any subsequent research, the independent organization could satisfy the goals underlying the adoption of
accreditation requirements: ensuring free exchange of scientific information and maintaining both intellectual property rights and the unique sov20 3
ereignty standings of the polar regions.
Though one scholar has supported the idea of accreditation as a
method of ensuring compliance with the principles of the Antarctic Treaty
System, this option would be highly impractical and would likely have little
impact on MGR research missions. 20 4 In the absence of a binding instrument, compliance with an accreditation system would remain voluntary.
Although a "code of conduct" such as this would be easier to negotiate and
modify than a comprehensive instrument, implementation levels would be
limited due to the difficulty of monitoring compliance and the absence of
20 5
punitive measures for noncompliance.
196. ARICO & SALPIN, supra note 2, at 37.
197. GJERDE ET AL., supra note 184, at 16.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See id.
G6mez-Robledo & Hill, supra note 27, 1 35.
Marine Genetic Resources, supra note 48, § 5.2.
See Weber, supra note 29, at 349.
See id. at 351-52.
See id. at 354.
See id.
See GJERDE ET AL., supra note 184, at 8.
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Reforming or Expanding Regional Institutions

An alternative approach to the extraterritorial MGR access and benefitsharing problems is modifying existing regional agreements or creating
new ones. Though delegates at the 2008 Working Group meeting primarily discussed this option in the context of marine biodiversity conservation, 20 6 a parallel argument can be made for access and benefit sharing of
MGRs. Regional regulations and cooperative management of MGRs generally eschew the rule of capture in favor of a more equitable approach to
access and benefit sharing. 20 7 This generally leads to the benefits of
enhanced monitoring and compliance mechanisms among participating
nations, uniformity of specimen collection protocols, decreased likelihood
of disputes over resource exploitation by participating nations, and
20 8
increased funding for research and recovery missions.
The Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System (MBRS) is one example of how
a regional approach to genetic resource management can create equitable
access and benefit-sharing rules. 20 9 The MBRS is an extensive network of
coral reefs reaching from Mexico to Honduras that contains a vast array of
biodiversity, including numerous species of economic value. 2 10 In 2001,
Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico-whose coastlines border the
MBRS-formed an agreement to cooperate in the conservation and management of the system and its natural resources by coordinating national
policies and sharing scientific knowledge. 2 1 1 The World Bank has already
provided funding for this project, and many scholars consider the agreement to be a model for future international collaborations regarding
genetic resources. 2 12 Although the project is still in an early phase and
does not address either the commercial exploitation of MGRs or extraterritorial resources, 2 13 the MBRS serves as a prime example of how regional
agreements represent an efficient and effective means of regulating the
2 14
access to and the use of natural resources.
Though regional regulation would not be appropriate for MGRs in all
areas of the world's oceans, 2 15 it could be useful for the Arctic polar region.
206. See Marine Biodiversity Working Group Highlights: Wednesday, 30 April 2008,
BULL. (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Winnipeg, Canada) May 1,
2008, at 1 [hereinafter Marine Biodiversity Highlights], available at http://www.iisd.ca/
download/pdf/enb2547e.pdf; see also G6mez-Robledo & Hill, supra note 27, at 26-31.
207. See McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 322-26.
208. See id.
209. See Rettig, supra note 113, at 262-63.
210. See id. at 263-64.
211. See McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 325.
212. See id. at 326.
213. See Rettig, supra note 113, at 264.
214. See McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 326-28.
215. Although the Antarctic Treaty System technically is an example of regional regulation, its complex sovereignty status makes it an unlikely candidate for reform to
include MGR regulation. See ARico & SALPIN, supra note 2, at 59; Herber, supra note
101, at 144; see also supra Part II.A. For a comprehensive survey of regional access and
EARTH NEGOTIATIONS

benefit sharing programs throughout the world, see
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In addition to the Nordic Council, another intergovernmental forum exists
2 16
to address sustainable development in the Arctic: the Arctic Council.

Members of the Arctic Council include Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ice2 17
land, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States.
Although the Arctic Council has not yet discussed the issue of Arctic
genetic resource access and benefit sharing,2 1 8 the Council could provide
an ideal forum for drafting a regional agreement. As previously discussed,
a truly effective gap-filling measure will require the cooperation of the
world's major biotechnology players. The participation of United States in
the Arctic Council and its continued commitment to playing an active role
in the international regulation of the Arctic region suggest that an effective
2 19
regional agreement could be feasible.
Despite the promising prospects of crafting a regional agreement for
MGR access and benefit sharing in the Arctic region, a number of drawbacks exist. One such drawback is the potential for creating a patchwork
of inconsistent regulations throughout the world.2 2 0 Moreover, the interests of the Arctic nations might not reflect the interests of the broader international community. 22 1

Additionally, negotiating a regional initiative

could be time-consuming and expensive, particularly if the participating
nations must create new institutions. 2 22 Another limitation of a regional
approach to extraterritorial MGR regulation is that, by definition, the controversial resources are located beyond national jurisdictions; thus, unlike
the resources in the MBRS, the Arctic Council would not have the authority
223
to grant or restrict access to or regulate benefit sharing of the resources.
Though member states might overlook this technicality in upholding the
agreement, non-member states could take advantage of this limitation.
D.

Creating a New Instrument

At the 2008 Working Group meeting, the EU proposed using the Inter224
national Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
(ITPGRFA) as a model to create a new legally binding instrument to
address extraterritorial MGR access and benefit sharing.2 2 5 ITPGRFA,
BENEFIT-SHARING MEASURES

(3d ed. 2005), available at http://www.cisdl.org/pdf/ABS_

ImpStudy-sm.pdf.
216. Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Sept. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M.
1382; see also Leary, Bi-Polar Disorder?,supra note 15, at 49.
217. See Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, supra note 216.
218. See Leary, Bi-Polar Disorder?, supra note 15, at 49.
219. See Presidential Directive, supra note 123.
220. See GJERDE ET AL., supra note 184, at 8.
221. See id. at 14.
222. See id. at 8.
223. See Rayfuse, supra note 17, at 7 (noting that the Arctic Council currently lacks
authority to create binding regulation); Rettig, supra note 113, at 262-63.
224. International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Nov.
3, 2001, available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/it/ITPGRe.pdf.
225. See Aleksander Ci~erov, Minister Plenipotentiary, Permanent Mission of Slovn. to
the United Nations, Statement to the Ad-Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group to
Study Issues Relating to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological
Diversity Beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction (Apr. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Ci~erov
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which entered into effect on June 29, 2004, requires its 116 signatory
nations to survey, catalog, and conserve plant genetic resources within
their jurisdictions; promote the sustainable use of those resources; and
provide technical assistance to developing member nations to fulfill their
duties under the treaty. 226 The EU emphasized the desirability of creating

an instrument that would utilize a "multilateral system of access and benefit-sharing" as ITPGRFA does by requiring members to freely share germplasm from specific plants with other nations and to pay an equitable share
of any economic benefits derived from commercialization of plant products obtained through the system. 2 27 The EU also noted that using
ITPGRFA as a model for a new instrument could quell the debate between
the rule of capture and the common heritage of mankind in part;2 28
although the raw genetic information from MGRs would become part of
the public domain, nations that do not wish to share the technological
developments derived from MGR research could alternatively elect to pay a
22 9
percentage of their commercial benefits to an international fund.
Although the EU's proposal appears promising, its implementation
would be difficult. As a preliminary matter, a major difference between the
genetic materials targeted by ITPGRFA and the proposed treaty is that the
former are located within member states' jurisdictions whereas the latter
involves MGRs located beyond all national jurisdictions. 230 Consequently,
unlike with plant genetic resources that might be unique to the habitats of
another ITPGRFA member state, developed nations with the necessary
infrastructure to carry out deep-sea missions to locate and acquire MGRs
23 1
do not have a similar incentive to sign on to such a treaty.

Moreover, as with the creation of any new international, legally binding instrument, the negotiation process could take a significant amount of
time. 23 2 The inherent difficulty of drafting a universally agreeable instrument that is broad enough to achieve its intended goals but narrow enough
so as not to interfere with the existing legal and regulatory framework will
233
likely create significant delays in the implementation of a new treaty.

This appears to be the case with the EU's proposed treaty. At the Working
Group meeting, attending delegates were sharply divided on whether using
ITPGRFA as a model would adequately address MGR access and benefit
sharing. 2 34 Additionally, because the new instrument cannot conflict with
Speech], available at http://www.eu2008.si/en/News-andDocuments/Statements in_
International Organisations/April/0430UN Agenda item_5_e_.html.
226. See International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture,
supra note 224, arts. 5.1, 13.
227. See id. arts. 10-13; see Cierov Speech, supra note 225.
228. See Ci~erov Speech, supra note 225.
229. See id.
230. Id.
231. See John Charles Kunich, Losing Nemo: The Mass Extinction Now Threatening the
World's Ocean Hotspots, 30 COLUM.J. ENVrL. L. 1, 102-03 (2005) (discussing state incentives in environmental treaty law).
232. See GJERDE ET AL., supra note 184, at 16.
233. See id. at 9.
234. Marine Biodiversity Highlights, supra note 206, at 1.
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the relevant provisions of other treaties, such as UNCLOS, the negotiation
process would likely require additional lengthy debates, such as the status
of MGRs.

235

Additionally, using ITPGRFA as a model is problematic because the
United States and Japan have refused to sign the Treaty due to its lack of
clarity regarding intellectual property rights. 2 36 As with the proposed
amendments to UNCLOS, the impact of a new treaty similar to ITPGRFA
would be limited if the nations with the most significant biotechnology
powers do not agree to the treaty's terms. In order for a new treaty to
successfully regulate MGR access and benefit sharing in the polar regions
and the rest of the world, it must adequately address the intellectual property rights of member states and of private, commercial entities within
those nations. 23 7 Consequently, until further developments are made in
negotiating such an instrument, it remains unclear what type of impact it
could have on the polar regions.
E.

The Future of MGR Access and Benefit Sharing Negotiations

In the absence of implementing any of the gap-filling measures proposed earlier, the deadlock among UN member states could prolong the
current practice of following the rule of capture and allowing developed
nations to continue to dominate MGR acquisition and research. 238 At the
2008 Working Group meeting, the delegate from the United States argued
against the modification of any existing treaties and the implementation of
new treaties by claiming that developing nations already benefit from the
discoveries of developed nations. 2 39 Though maintaining the status quo is
essentially similar to including MGR collection in the list of freedoms on
the high seas under UNCLOS, this result would not be the most equitable
outcome because it overlooks the interests of a large percentage of the
world's nations.
The most promising solution to the issues of polar MGR access and
benefit sharing, but perhaps the most difficult to achieve, would be for UN
delegates to resolve the status of all extraterritorial MGRs under UNCLOS.
Despite the unique legal and regulatory frameworks of the Arctic and
Antarctic regions, the most equitable and efficient result would be for the
MGRs in those regions to be treated in the same way as others. Regardless
of whether the delegates opt for a common heritage of mankind or rule of
capture approach, this solution would ensure that the polar regions are
kept in uniformity with the rest of the world's oceans and prevent the creation of a patchwork of inconsistent regulations. Moreover, if the United
235. See GJERDE ET AL., supra note 184, at 9; supra Part II.B.
236. Shawn N. Sullivan, Plant Genetic Resources and the Law: Past, Present, and Future,

135
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13 (2004).

237. See id. at 14 for further discussion of ITPGRFA's unclear stance on intellectual
property rights.
238. See Zewers, supra note 13, at 175.
239. See Marine Biodiversity Highlights, supra note 206.
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States were to accede to UNCLOS in its entirety, this approach would provide a very strong solution to the problem.
If the UNCLOS member states are unable to reach a consensus on how
to amend the treaty, the next best alternative for polar MGR regulation
would be to implement a combination of the other gap-filling measures
mentioned in this Note-also known as the "toolbox" approach. 240 Due to
the inherent difficulties of negotiating a new instrument aimed directly at
extraterritorial MGRs, either generally or in the Arctic or Antarctic regions,
interested parties in the polar regions and throughout the world should
instead focus on short- and medium-term solutions, such as implementing
or expanding regional MGR rights management programs. Although the
Antarctic Treaty System already represents an effective example of regional
regulation, the Treaty's member states are unlikely to expand its coverage
to include MGR regulation. 24 1 However, a regional MGR rights management program could provide a feasible method for regulating MGR access
and benefit sharing in the Arctic. Even though this approach would not
provide the widespread, binding control that could result from either
amending UNCLOS or creating a new instrument, this solution could provide more immediate results and participating nations could modify such
agreements once the MGR industry develops further. Finally, short-term
solutions, such as implementing licensing and accreditation requirements
for bioprospecting in the polar regions, though extremely limited in efficacy, could serve as an additional measure to fill part of the gaps in the
regulation of extraterritorial polar MGRs.
Conclusion
In the coming years, technological advances are likely to increase commercial demand and interest in MGRs and their byproducts. 24 2 A result of
the increased demand and profits from these advances may be further
debates about the proper form of benefit sharing from extraterritorial
MGRs and further politicization of the issues. This will be particularly true
for MGRs in the Arctic and Antarctic regions due to their unique genetic
characteristics and broad commercial utility.
Although the complex legal and regulatory status of the polar regions
poses a substantial hurdle to implementing comprehensive gap-filling measures for MGR regulation, the United Nations and relevant regional political bodies for the Arctic and Antarctic should take additional steps now to
rectify the inadequacy of the current regulatory framework rather than
waiting for the problem to worsen. The United Nations' proactive approach
to the problem through in-depth discussions in the General Assembly,
Informal Consultative Process, and Working Group represents a positive
240. G6mez-Robledo & Hill, supra note 27, 44 (noting that some delegates favored
the use of short- and medium-term measures while a long-term solution is negotiated).
241. See Herber, supra note 101, at 144.
242. See David Leary et al., Marine Genetic Resources: A Review of Scientific and Commercial Interest, 33 MARINE POL'Y 183, 189-91 (2009) (discussing the commercial and
potential market value of MGRs).
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step towards reaching an equitable and feasible solution to the problem as
a whole. The UN should continue in its current path and strongly
encourage member states to overcome their fundamentally contrasting
viewpoints to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. If member nations
cannot reach a consensus on the proper classification of MGRs under
UNCLOS, smaller measures-in the form of regional rights management
programs or short-term actions-would be better than no action at all.
Finally, it is important to note that the issue of extraterritorial MGR
access and benefit sharing in the polar regions does not exist in an analytical vacuum. Though access and benefit sharing are property law concerns
and thus distinct from other legal fields, a truly effective solution must be
compatible with the wider context of treaties and laws regarding topics
such as environmental regulation and intellectual property rights. The
path forward for MGR access and benefit-sharing regulation in the Arctic
and Antarctic regions undoubtedly will be difficult. However, with cooperation and determination, a feasible, acceptable solution should be
possible.

